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Abstract 
For the first time in the political history of Ghana since independence, a transfer of political power was regulated 
by a legal blueprint. The first test for implementing major aspects of Ghana’s Presidential Transition Act, 2012 
(Act 845) was the post-2012 election period. This paper undertakes an assessment of how the law was 
implemented. The approach taken involves an evaluation of what worked well, a review of what could not work 
to perfection and a consideration of policy alternatives. The findings drawn from the assessment provide 
encouraging evidence of the law being put into practice. However, several challenges emerged. To address them, 
reform proposals are outlined to fine-tune Ghana’s future political transition process and enhance the effective 
implementation of the law which remains integral to good governance and possess the potential of closing a 
chapter in the country’s dismal history of democratic transitions. 
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1. Introduction 
Ghana’s reputation as a model African democracy owes much to its ability to change governments through the 
ballot box (Ofori-Mensah, 2013). It is, then, ironic that the changes in government through the democratic 
process have exposed serious short coming in the country’s governance institutional framework. In fact, Ghana’s 
record on political transitions is not a proud one. Due to a history of coup d’etats, the country did not have any 
experience in handling democratic transitions until 2001 (Ahwoi, 2009:23; Gyampo, 2013:167) – the first time in 
Ghana’s history when power was transferred from one democratically elected President to another through the 
electoral process. The second was in 2009. The transition related stories of administrative lapses, forced 
evictions and ad hoc seizure of cars, among others left Ghanaians polarized after the transfer of power (ibid:25).  
Indeed, the political transition from the National Democratic Congress (NDC) Government to the New Patriotic 
Party (NPP) Government represented a political and constitutional first in the country. It was the first time in the 
history of post-independence Ghana that political power had been constitutionally transferred from one political 
party to a different political party. For that very reason, there was no precedent to guide the two parties that were 
involved in the transition, and therefore many mistakes were made (Ahwoi, 2009; Gyampo, 2013). Those 
mistakes left in their wake acrimony, tension, ill-feeling and a lot of bad blood which in turn led to intense 
interparty hostility (Ahwoi, 2009:27). The lesson from that botched transition of 2001 was that the nation must 
prepare for future transitions of that nature by agreeing on a multi-partisan framework and ground rules and 
regulations to govern and guide the transitions of the future. Underlying that framework must be an appreciation 
of the difference between “y’atu aban” (we have overthrown the Government) and “y’asesa aban” (we have 
changed the Government). Because the only precedent available in 2001 was one of “y’atu aban”, that transition 
was guided more by features of dealing with an overthrown Government than with a changed Government (ibid). 
There are a few studies on transitions in Ghana including the works of Nkansah (2012); Ofori-Mensah (2013); 
Ahwoi (2009); Gyimah-Boadi (2001); Ninsin (1998); Segal (1996); and Oquaye (2000). These studies have 
discussed how political transitions in Ghana’s Fourth Republic 1  have been conducted and quintessentially, 
focused on the transitions prior to that of 2013. They merely discussed how administrative and political power 
was transferred from one leader to another with some highlighting the challenges of such transitions including 
uncooperative attitude of out-going leaders, scanty information about the previous administration regarding state 
assets, resources, funds as well as what had been accomplished and what is in progress. Others described the 
                                               
1
 Fourth Republic simply refers to Ghana’s Fourth attempt at constitutional Democracy which began in 1992.  The First 
Republic spanned 1960-1966; the Second Republic was from 1969-1972; and the Third Republic was from 1991-1981. 
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previous transitions as façade; and fraught with acrimony, tension, and rancour.  
As a response to the past transition challenges, the Institute of Economic affairs-Ghana Political Parties 
Programme (IEA-GPPP) began work in 2007 to prepare a multi-partisan framework of ground rules and 
regulations to govern future transitions2 It is important to emphasize that there was a cross-party consensus that 
reforming the transition process in Ghana to rid it off its challenges required that it should have a statutory 
underpinning. In this regard, The IEA-GPPP held several discussions that culminated in the drafting of  The 
IEA-GPPP Transition Bill3 which was passed by Parliament on March 16, 2012 and signed into law on May 31, 
2012 as the Presidential Transition Act, 2012 (Act 845).  This piece of legislation which draws on practical 
lessons from Ghana’s previous transitions is the first of its kind in Ghana that served as the blueprint to guide the 
2013 transfer of power from the Mills-Mahama administration (2008-2012) to the Mahama/Amissah-Arthur 
administration (2012-2016).  
Generally, the dearth of literature on the administrative and political aspect of transitions has been observed by a 
number of scholars including Rainey and Wechsler (1988); Sherwood and Chackerian (1988); and Bynander and 
t’Hart (2006). Even though transitions are integral to effective public sector management, the process, in many 
parts of the world, is often beset by lack of blueprints to regulate it, inadequate preparations and orientation 
(Rainey and Wechsler, (1988). This explains why the passage of the Presidential Transition Law in Ghana, was 
hailed as a useful attempt to regulate the transfer of power in a manner that ensures national unity, policy 
continuity and effective public sector management (Ofori-Mensah, 2013).  
However, no study has been conducted in Ghana on the 2012 Presidential Transition Law and how it was 
implemented in the 2013 transition. This paper attempts to contribute to the literature on transitions by assessing 
how the Presidential Transition Law was implemented. It highlights the central features of the law and discusses 
the challenges in its implementation, lessons learnt and prescribes the way forward in a manner that strengthens 
the law and also contributes to the governance policy debate as well as democratic progression and consolidation 
in Ghana. Being a purely qualitative study, the methodology involves a presentation of an overview of the law; 
an evaluation of what worked well in its implementation; a review of what did not work; and a consideration of 
amendment proposals. Before these are done, some conceptual issues that serve as the framework of analysis are 
discussed. 
 
2. Democracy, Succession, and Transition  
The current theories on democracy recognize that the utopian view of democracy as self rule is no longer tenable 
in view of the complexity of modernity and political realties on the ground (Bohman, 2010; Warren, 2010). The 
new world view of democracy emphasizes self determination and reflective institutions which allow for revision 
of decisions and procedures by a ―deliberative generation. Within the contexts of this paper, Bohman‘s 
definition of democracy is being adopted as a ―set of institutions by which individuals are empowered as free 
and equal citizens to form and change the terms of the common life together, including democracy itself. In this 
sense, democracy is self reflexive and consists of procedures by which its rules and practices are made subject to 
the deliberation of citizens themselves (ibid:2). One of the institutional core of democracy which is generally 
accepted as basic to all forms of democracy is periodic elections often regulated by law.  In the view of 
Huntington (2009:32) competitive elections should be the means of selecting principal officers of government in 
all democratic regimes.  Thus, election is the badge of democracy and the principal apparatus that is the 
Executive and Legislative arms are subjected to periodic change and reconstitution. The term of office of the 
principal members is fixed and a process is put in place to determine the next leader (Nkansah, 2012:9).   
 
Implicit in democracy therefore, is the element of succession. This happens when a change of the principal 
leader with personnel decision making power of hiring and firing as well as that of policy making powers occurs 
within the contemplation of the law (ibid). The trigger for succession in democracy is elections or succession 
without elections by virtue of the death or the removal from office of an incumbent (Abbot, 2005: 627). This 
should be distinguished from a situation where the maximum leader could be replaced by other means not within 
                                               
2
 The IEA-GPPP is an inter-party group comprising representatives of the four main political parties in Ghana that have 
representation in Parliament. They meet once every month at the IEA Secretariat to brainstorm and discuss issues of national 
importance in an a-political manner. The Programme is sponsored by the Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy 
(NIMD) through the IEA. 
3
 I am the Co-ordinator of The IEA-GPPP and worked with several consultants to draft the 2012 Transition Bill. After the Bill 
had been drafted, I organized several workshops for members of The IEA-GPPP to discuss and to make their input into it. 
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the contemplation of the law. The nature of succession is a pointer to how a political system is being 
institutionalized. In theory, Govea and Holm (1998) distinguished between two types of leadership succession as 
institutionalized succession and un-institutionalized succession. Institutionalized succession is achieved by a 
selection process laid down by law with a peaceful and orderly transition, whereas the reverse is the case for the 
other type.  
 
Succession necessarily involves a transition from one leader to another (Govea & Holm, 1998:132). By the 
American President Transition Act of 1963 (as amended) transition is concerned with the orderly transfer of 
executive power in connection with the expiration of the term of office of a President and the inauguration of a 
new president. In the words of Ahwoi (2009), “transition is a transfer of authority and responsibility within the 
Executive Arm of the State”. In a wider sense, transition refers to “… a change in regime such as from an 
authoritarian regime to a democratic regime. In this sense, it refers to an era in the development of a country, 
when conscious efforts are made to overcome a political order characterized by institutional disarray and 
normative incongruence, recurring political instability, institutional breakdown as well as extreme disorders by 
substituting it with one that is institutionally coherent and stable...” (Ninsin, 1998: 4). In this wider sense Ghana 
as a nation is in transition from an authoritarian rule to a democratic rule and for that matter Ghana is a 
transitional democracy (Nkansah, 2012). In the narrower sense, transition connotes a change from one 
government to the other within the same regime in a political system and the processes involved in the change 
(Gyampo, 2013; Ahwoi, 2009).  
 
In this study, transition connotes a change in the narrower sense. Democratic transition within the contexts of 
this paper therefore refers to the process by which the new or incoming government emerges, the outgoing hands 
over government to the incoming leadership and the incoming president in the case of Ghana takes over power to 
form a new government. Therefore, transition is both administrative and political and covers a time frame, 
activities and processes to elect a leader and transfer the governance of a country from one administration to 
another. Abbot et al (2002) maintained that the processes leading to the installation of the new leader legitimizes 
the succession. The institutionalization of succession as shown by the nature of transition is a pointer to the 
prevailing condition of democratization in a given context; whether the system is progressing towards liberalism 
or a reverse (Govea and Holm, 1998). In the view of Huntington (2009), succession provides a test for 
adaptability; one of the criteria for institutionalization in terms of how a system is able to transfer power from 
one group to the other in the face of the changing social or political contexts. The institutionalization should be 
anchored in a clear and unambiguous policy, laid down processes and procedures, and guided by a culture of 
tolerance, accommodation, and respect for fundamental human rights. These should be reflective in the 
applicable laws, ideological goals, attitudes, behaviours and practices as discernible during the transitions 
(Nkansah, 2012:11).  
 
In Ghana, the passage of the Presidential Transition Law testifies to the attempt at institutionalizing the transfer 
of power from one administration to the other. As a transitional democracy, Ghana through the conduct of 
“improved” and credible elections continues to demonstrate the zeal and determination to climb the ladder of 
democratic progression to an advanced liberal democracy as espoused by Diamond (1997). The conduct of 
credible elections undoubtedly suggests that there will be political succession. Transition, both in the 
administrative and political sense is crucial because it provides the linkage between credible and democratic 
elections and succession. In this regard, the need for a legal framework to smoothen transitional process is 
crucial to the conduct of elections and succession. With this conceptual clarity, the next section of this paper re-
focuses discussions on Ghana’s Presidential Transition Act. 
 
3. Brief Highlights of the Presidential Transition Act 
As stated in the Memorandum of the law, the primary objective of the Presidential Transition Law (Act 845) is to 
provide a framework for managing the political and administrative transfer of power from an out-going 
democratically elected President to an in-coming President. But its benefits transcend regime change. This is 
evident in key attributes of accountability, institutional clarity and a structured time frame for managing the 
transition process. 
 
3.1 Accountability 
This is the centerpiece of the Presidential Transition Act. The law makes provision for periodic stocktaking and 
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an inventory of executive assets This requirement covers state assets in both the official and private residences of 
senior public officers including the President, Vice President and Ministers of State. The Law also stipulates that 
handing over notes covering a broad range of public offices are to be submitted to the Administrator-General not 
later than 30 days before a presidential election. This provision will engender good record-keeping and provide 
new leadership in key government institutions with essential background knowledge to undertake their functions. 
 
3.2 Institutional Clarity 
A new body established under the law-the Presidential Estates Unit (PEU) is charged with maintaining and 
keeping the inventory of executive assets. The Unit is headed by an Administrator-General who is granted the 
same terms and conditions of service as a Justice of the Court of Appeal. This enshrines in the statute the 
independence and security of tenure for the Administrator-General. Broadly, the Administrator-General has the 
role of facilitating the transition process. The law also details key officials who should comprise the Transition 
Team from both the sides of both the out-going and in-coming President. In fact, as the Transition Team works 
by consensus, the law, importantly, provides an orderly process for resolving transition related disagreements. 
This is through a three-member Advisory Council comprising the Speaker of Parliament as the chairperson; one 
eminent citizen appointed by the incumbent President and another eminent citizen appointed by the person 
elected as President. 
 
3.3 Structured Time Frame 
The law also specifies a structured time-frame for the Transition Team to be formed- within 24 hours after the 
declaration of the presidential election results. Clear timelines are also set for out-going Ministers to vacate their 
official accommodation (within three months after the presidential inauguration). Finally, the law also attempts 
to improve the timing of presidential inaugurations. Prior to the law, Parliament has been sworn in on the same 
day as the President with only short interval separating the two events. This had led to a catalogue of lapses in 
protocol, delays and logistical challenges relating to the presidential inauguration. It is within this context that 
the law makes the requirement that the election of the Speaker of Parliament together with the swearing –in of 
Parliamentarians be conducted two days before the dissolution of Parliament – but with the aforementioned 
taking office on January 7. Thus January 7 under the law is solely for the inauguration ad swearing-in of the 
President. 
 
 
4 Implementing the Law in the 2013 Transition: Lessons and Challenges 
4.1 Appointment of Administrator-General 
An important aspect of implementing the law came on November 9, 2012 with the appointment of Mr. Joseph 
Issacher as the Administrator-General by President John Mahama. This appointment is significant given the 
appointee’s extensive experience in public service, which culminated in his one time appointment as head of 
Ghana’s Civil Service. The appointee was therefore widely described as suitable for this important position 
(Ofori-Mensah, 2013). 
 
4.2 The 2013 Transition Team 
The post-2012 election period presented the first test for implementing major aspects of the law. It is important 
to emphasize that executive level transition occurs even with the re-election of an incumbent as happened in 
Ghana following the 2012 elections. Indeed, the law provides for this under section 1(3) of Act 845. Thus, 
President Mahama duly followed the provisions of the law and appointed a Transition Team after he was 
declared the President-elect.4 However, the 22-member team appointed by the President could be considered as 
sizeable, as this was not a transition from one democratically elected President to another. It must however be 
noted that the law itself does not place any cap on the number of people to be appointed to constitute the 
Transition Team. Again, in the case of when an incumbent is re-elected, the law simply states that the President 
shall designate members of the Transition Team – with no set limit. 
 
4.3 Advisory Council 
President Mahama also appointed an Advisory Council (the three-member conflict resolution body) for the 
transition (Daily Graphic, 2012:3). This was not necessary. Given that technically, the 2013 Transition was one 
of an incumbent President handing over power to himself. Consequently, there was only one chairperson for the 
                                               
4
 See http://politics.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201212/98511.php for details on this. 
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Transition Team as opposed to co-chairs in the case of an incoming and an out-going administration. In this 
regard, the sole chair for the 2013 Transition Team could have ruled on conflicts. In practice, no conflict ensued 
in the transition process and the Advisory Council was “outmoded from birth.” In the considered opinion of 
these authors, the existence of the Advisory Council throughout the period of the 2013 transition was a complete 
waste of state resources. 
 
4.4 Handing Over Notes 
Handing over notes covering key public offices are crucial for continuity and effective operation of government 
business especially when a change in leadership occurs. It is in view of this that section 6(4) of the Transition 
Law stipulates that handing over notes covering key public offices including the Presidency, Government 
Ministries, Departments and Agencies “shall be presented to the Administrator-General not later than 30 days 
before the date of the presidential election.” Unfortunately, in the transition under review, this provision was 
breached. The call for handing over notes came late – on December 12, 2012 when presidential elections had 
taken place on December 7, 2012. Further, a press release issued by the Transition Team stated that the relevant 
government appointees had been directed to submit their handing over notes to the Vice President by January 1, 
2013 (Ghana News Agency, 2012:2). Clearly, this was another breach as the recipient of handing over notes 
according to the law was the Administrator-General and not the Vice President. Again, the cut-off date 
announced by the Transition Team was 53 days past the deadline set by Act 845. Perhaps, the late appointment of 
the Administrator-General may have had a role in the delays. However, given the fact that the Transition Law 
was already in the statute book, handing over notes should have been prepared well ahead of time to ensure 
compliance with the law. 
 
4.5 Swearing-in of Parliament 
Initially, there were disagreements with regards to the implementation of section 11 of the law, which covers the 
election of the Speaker and wearing-in of a new Parliament. The argument was that the Transition Law was 
inconsistent with the 1992 Constitution. Article 113 (1) of the 1992 Constitution provides that “…Parliament 
shall continue for four years from the date of its first sitting and shall then stand dissolved.” In the 2013 
transition scenario, this implied that Parliament stood dissolved only after midnight of January 7, 2013.5 The 
Transition Act, however, states that a new Parliament must be sworn in two days before dissolution but assume 
office on January 7. The argument was that if the swearing-in went ahead, as per the Transition Law, then two 
Parliaments would have been in existence, a scenario which was considered unconstitutional. In view of these 
disagreements, Parliament was sworn in at the earliest opportunity –shortly after midnight on January 7, 2013. 
The midnight swearing-in nonetheless, posed its own set of challenges as the timing was not ideal and 
“ungodly.” Consequently, many Parliamentarians who were to participate in the inauguration and swearing-in of 
the President in the early hours of January 7, 2013 complained of tiredness, severe headaches and bodily pains 
due to the midnight sitting.6 
 
Several other directives from the Presidency and Transition Team were issued with reference to Act 845. For 
example, the Transition Team reminded all Ministers and political appointees occupying government 
accommodation that, in accordance with the Transition Law, they had up to three months after the presidential 
inauguration to vacate their accommodation and to hand over their official vehicles (Ghana News Agency, 2012). 
This directive was however not fully complied with by the appointees of the previous administration as many of 
them were re-appointed and re-assigned different portfolios to serve in the Mahama/Amissah-Arthur 
administration.  Those who were not re-appointed did not vacate their official residence and hand over their 
vehicles, yet no one could sanction them.7 
 
Overall, in spite of the challenges raised above, the 2013 Transition was orderly and much of this could be 
attributed to the framework provided by Act 845 (Ofori-Mensah, 2013). Indeed, the 2013 transition and 
presidential inauguration could be described as one of the finest in Ghana’s history. During the transition under 
                                               
5
 The Fifth (previous) Parliament’s first sitting was on January 7, 2009. 
 
6
 Dr. Benjamin Kumbuor, Majority Leader of the Sixth Parliament of the Fourth Republic made this point when I interviewed 
him in Accra  on November 19, 2013 
7
 At a forum to review Ghana’s 2013 Transition organized by the IEA-GPPP in Accra on May, 17, 2013, Mr. Joseph Issachar, 
the Administrator-General made this point. 
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review, even though the transfer of power was from one administration to the other, strictly speaking, President 
John Mahama was a Vice President to the late President JE.A Mills for three years and seven months. President 
Mahama was acclaimed to continue the term of President. J.E.A Mills when the latter died five months to the 
2012 elections. Part of the reasons for the smooth transition in 2013 was therefore attributed to the fact that 
“Mahama handed over to himself even though the political regime and administration was to be different.8” 
Therefore, it is worth noting that there are key aspects of the law that remain to be tested and some of these will 
only come into force when a transfer of power from one elected president to another from a different political 
party occurs.  
 
5 The Way Forward 
To address the implementation challenges and to ensure that the law is able to better regulate the transfer of 
power, particularly from one president to another from a different political party in a manner that truly checks 
rancor, acrimony and ensure a smooth transfer of power, this section sets out six reform proposals.  These range 
from providing clarity to Act 845; making recommendations to ensure efficiency savings during transitions and 
proposals to obtain value for money in the administration of state assets. The case is also made for the 
introduction of subsidiary legislation to cover issues such as enforcement powers that will unlock the full 
potential of the transition reforms already in place. The reform proposals are as follows: 
 
 
5.1 Capping the Transition Team 
The lessons drawn from the implementation of the law suggest that there is scope for accruing efficiency savings 
on transition costs. In this regard, there is the need for a cap on the number of individuals appointed to constitute 
a Transition Team owing to the huge cost of honoraria on the public purse. The full expense of the 2013 
transition was not publicly available at the time of writing this paper9, but evidence from the 2009 transition 
suggests that honoraria for members of a Transition Team and its sub-committees account for more than half of 
transition expenses.10 The evidence indicates that for the 2009 transition, there was a total of 151 individuals on 
the Transition Team and its 10 sub-committees. Out of a total of GHC 361,924.41 spent on that year’s transition, 
GHC 208,800 was paid as honoraria to the 151 individuals (Parliamentary Debates, 2009).11 The honoraria alone 
represented 57 percent of the 2009 transition’s expenditure. Indeed, for the public, the cost of the transition was 
one of the more “eyebrow raising” elements relating to the change of government which led to a barrage of 
public criticism. Given that Ghana faces mounting economic challenges, which have resulted in “national belt-
tightening” in key sectors and basic infrastructure shortfalls, it will be prudent to show austerity in this area. 
 
In the case where an incumbent in re-elected, the law states that the President shall designate members of the 
Transition Team. The 22 member Transition Team in 2013 is almost identical to the number of individuals 
specified in the law if a transfer of power to a completely different administration occurs. In the case when an 
incumbent is re-elected, a statutory cap of about 12 could help limit the cost relating to Transition Team 
appointees. Further, while section 4(2) of the law provides a cap for sub-committee membership (not more than 
five persons), there is no limit on the number of sub-committees which may be formed in addition to the three 
                                               
8
 Mr. P.V. Obeng, a member of the 2013 Transition Team made this point in a personal communication with him in Accra on 
November 10, 2013. 
 
9
 Several efforts to ascertain the full cost of the 2013 transition from the Transition Team proved futile due to unwillingness 
to release such information by officials of the Team. Two main reasons may account for this. First, anecdotal evidence 
abounds that the cost of the 2003 transition far exceeds that of the 2009 and given the barrage of public criticism of the huge 
cost of the 2009 transition, the fear of more negative public reaction has compelled officials to be tight-lipped on the cost of 
the 2013 transition. Secondly, governmental activities continue to be shrouded in opacity as the nation has been denied the 
benefits of a Right to Information Law (RTI). The RTI bill was initiated by The IEA in 1996 but remained a bill as at the time 
of writing this paper. 
 
10
 Interview with Mr. Kwadwo Mpiani, former Chief of Staff and member of the 2009 Transition Team in Accra on 
November 13, 2013. 
 
11
 The Memorandum to the Presidential Transition Bill, 2012 indicates that there were 10 sub-committees for the 2009 
Transition. The Finance Ministers statement in Parliament, noted above, is what stated that the cost incurred was attributed to 
the Transition Team and its ten sub-committees. 
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statutory sub-committees under the law.12 Section 4(d) of the law leaves the establishment of additional sub-
committees to the discretion of Transition Team. To check the cost of transitions, there is a strong case for also 
imposing a limit on sub-committees that may be formed to a maximum of five. The Administrator-General, 
working together with the Head of Civil Service, could design a scheme whereby a team of senior civil servants 
from key ministries are seconded to support the work of the Transition Team where necessary. This will provide 
much needed expertise and also limit the need for extra appointees on the Transition Team and its sub-
committees. 
 
5.2 Clarity on the Establishment of an Advisory Council 
The Advisory Council is a valuable aspect of the law with its role clearly defined as a conflict resolution body. 
The Council becomes relevant when Transition Team co-chairs, in the case of an in-coming and out-going 
administration, fail to find common ground on a core issue relating to the transition. This is clearly stated in the 
Memorandum to the Presidential Transition Bill, 2010. On the other hand, when an incumbent is retained in 
office, the sole Transition chairperson can rule on disagreements within the Team when they arise. In this respect, 
it is proposed that Act 845 be amended to nullify the establishment of an Advisory Council when an incumbent is 
re-elected. In addition to providing clarity to this part of the legislation, the proposal will also prevent the 
recurrence of the 2013 transition experience and overall, save the nation from the potential cost of allowances 
paid to the Council. 
 
5.3 Swearing-in- of Parliament  
As indicated above, the early swearing-in of Parliament under section 11 of Act 845 had been deemed 
unconstitutional. But the legality of the swearing-in issue was carefully examined during the consideration stage 
of the Presidential Transition Bill by Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional, Legal and Parliamentary 
Affairs.13 It is, then surprising that the same Parliament, which debated and passed Act 845 deemed a section it 
approved as unconstitutional. Further, the same administration which enacted the legislation has also cited legal 
opinion which views section 11 as unconstitutional. Given this backdrop, it is, perhaps unsurprising that there 
exists a palpable sense of hesitation among some political leaders on the unconstitutionality issue. 
 
A settled view on this matter is therefore required. Swearing-in Parliament in the early hours of January 7 (which 
is deemed constitutional) certainly contributed to the smooth presidential inauguration of 2013. But the midnight 
sitting of Parliament poses its own logistical and practical difficulties and a plausible alternative may be required. 
The proposed approach to settling this issue is, first, to consider the school of thought of a Supreme Court 
interpretation of Article 113 vis-à-vis section 11 of Act 845. In the event of the Court ruling that Act 845 is 
unconstitutional, the alternative step will be the option of a constitutional amendment which will enable the next 
Parliament to be sworn in on January 5, 2017 (after the upcoming 2016 elections). This option will require 
dissolving the current Parliament two days short of its four-year term, which in the view of the authors of this 
paper would do no harm to the nation’s democracy. 
 
5.4 Enforcement Powers for the Administrator-General 
Although the Transition Act confers a range of duties on the Administrator-General’s office, it does not empower 
the office to deal with possible breaches. For the Act to be effective, powers that can strengthen the hand of the 
Administrator-General in carrying out the statutory duties conferred on that office remain crucial. For example, 
the Administrator-General must be able to surcharge public officials for missing or damaged state assets and 
impose penalties in the scenario where public officials fail to leave their state accommodation at the specified 
time. A subsidiary legislation may be promptly considered to address this. 
 
5.5 Administrator-General Reporting to Parliament 
There ought to be a statutory requirement for the Administrator-General to submit an annual report to Parliament 
within a set time frame, such as “not later than six months after the end of each financial year.” The report should 
provide an update on the national register of executive assets; timelines of inventories taken; cost of maintaining 
the assets portfolio, etc14. Given that the cost of government is a critical public policy issue that reverberates in 
                                               
12
 The three sub-committees specified in Act 845 are the Government, Inauguration and Presidency Sub-Committees. 
13
 Interview with Alban Bagbin, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional, Legal and Parliamentary 
Affairs in Accra on November, 20, 2013. 
14
 Security concerns may require concealing assets such as “safe-house” from the national register section in the proposed 
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the minds of many Ghanaians, the Transition Act can be tightened to ensure value for money. For example, 
effective management and maintenance of the large portfolio of executive assets, which the Administrator-
General and the Presidential Estates Unit will oversee, could accrue huge savings to the nation. This approach 
will also promote transparency in the management of state assets and provide a periodic opportunity to evaluate 
and debate value for money in the management of the executive estate. 
 
5.6 Addressing Potential Legal Technicalities 
Section 1(3) of the law states that “where an incumbent President is re-elected for a second term, the President 
shall designate members of the Transition Team.” The case of President Mahama, who assumed office as 
President in July 2012 upon the death of President J.E.A. Mills is evidence of a scenario whereby an 
“incumbent” who wins a general election may not necessarily have been elected for a “second term”. To avoid 
any potential legal challenges relating to strict adherence of this section, it is important to reflect the Mahama 
scenario in the law. One possible approach could be tweaking the first part of section 1(3) to simply state “where 
the incumbent is elected” – with the reference to second term deleted.15 Alternatively, another sub-section could 
be added to section 1 to provide for the Mahama scenario where an incumbent is elected for a first term. 
 
5.7 Changing the Date for General Elections 
Finally, it is important to mention that if the transition process is to be effective, changing the current general 
election date of December 7 is essential. This is due to the potentially short transition time-frame in the event of 
a presidential election run-off which per the 1992 Constitution is held 21 days after the declaration of the first 
presidential election results. Given that Ghana’s presidential inauguration is constitutionally set for January 7, 
there would be a limited transition period and the transfer of power may occur in haste in a manner that may 
compromise the quality of the process. 16  Thankfully, resolving this issue is a work in progress, as the 
Government White Paper on the Constitutional Review Commission has accepted recommendations for the 
presidential elections to be held on November 7 to allow ample transition period in the event of a presidential 
run-off. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
Transition, both in the administrative and political sense is crucial because it provides the linkage between 
democracy, elections and succession. The Presidential Transition Act remains integral to smoothen transition 
process as well as the conduct of elections (which is a badge of democracy) and succession. In the 
implementation of the law, there have been challenges and some lessons learnt. If fine-tuned, the law may not 
necessarily remove all the challenges relating to the democratic transfer of power. Nevertheless, it would provide 
an opportunity for Ghana to close a chapter on its dismal history of democratic transitions. Indeed, the 
framework provided by the law to guide the transfer of power guarantees a radical departure from the past 
rancorous and acrimonious transition process. There is cause for much optimism given the unanimous cross-
party support for the law. In charting the way forward, policy makers must act on the proposals set out in this 
paper in order to unleash the full potential of the law. 
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